



PROJECT DOCUMENT

Project Title: North West Prevention Facility Project

Project Number: To be determined

Implementing Partner: UNDP Nigeria

Start Date: July 2022

End Date: July 2025

BRIEF DESCRIPTION

Over the past three years, the Northwest Geopolitical zone of Nigeria has witnessed a rapid rise in the levels of violent conflict. A traditional farmer herder conflict has metamorphosed into a range of lethal cases of banditry, armed and organized crime with a negative knock-on effect on social and economic development in the region. The region features conflict patterns akin to the early stages of a protracted conflict, including those observed at the outset of the conflict in the Northeast zone of the country. A widespread and deep-rooted banditry phenomenon affects large parts of the population, with thousands of victims of violence every year, hundreds of thousands internally displaced persons, and considerable pressures on inter and intra-communal relations.

Rising insecurity has affected key social sectors – becoming increasingly intertwined with education as schools, teachers, and students have come under increasing attack. In 2021, 76% per cent of school attacks in Nigeria took place in the northwest; Kaduna state was the most frequently attacked (8/25), and Katsina (344 learners) followed by Zamfara states (327 learners) reported the highest number of abductees taken in a single abduction.[1] The unprecedented and growing attacks on schools in the NW Nigeria is reversing hard fought gains in access to, and retention of children in schools, in particular girls.

States Governments have attempted several responses to the crisis including facilitating political level mediation, community peace deals and amnesties coupled with military response coordinated by the Federal Government. Individual state peace deals and amnesties in relation to bandits (incl. incarcerated bandits) have largely failed, partly due the interwoven nature of the banditry phenomenon within communities across the states in the Northwest, as well as legitimacy questions and confidence deficits in disengagement and reintegration efforts. In most cases, the failure was a lack of the core political-security systems, mechanisms and structures that could foster confidence, sustain multi-level engagement, and effectively translate the local peace and development compacts into concrete actions while ensuring sustained peaceful co-existence.


The proposed Preventative Action Facility therefore seeks to catalyse timely, collaborative, and decisive, State led, cross-state and cross-border prevention efforts to the front line states of Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina. This is urgently required as the region is likely to descend into widespread loss of governance control over large swaths of territory, a possible humanitarian crisis and a new foothold for regional violent extremist actors with grave implications to Nigeria's security.

This investment is designed to lead to:

- OUTPUT1: Strengthened capacities at federal, state and cross-state levels for political accountability and shared commitment on peace and security in Zamfara, Sokoto and Katsina States**
- OUTPUT 2: Improved community capacities for conflict prevention, confidence and trust building in Zamfara, Katsina and Sokoto**
- OUTPUT 3: Cross-border governance, peace and security cooperation, and economic revitalization services strengthened**

Contributing Outcome (UNSDCF, CPD, RPD): Outcome 4.1 By 2027, people in Nigeria, especially the most vulnerable, benefit from peace and security, and protection from conflict, violence, and crime through strengthened capacity and infrastructures Indicative Output(s) with gender marker¹: Gender Marker 2	Total resources required:	\$41,910,423	
	Total resources allocated:	UNDP:	
		Donor:	
		Government:	
		In-Kind:	
Unfunded:	\$41,910,423		

Agreed by (signatures)

DEVELOPMENT PARTNER	UNDP
Print Name:	Print Name:   Mohamed Yahya Resident Representative, UNDP Nigeria 
Date:	Date: 11 August 2022

¹ The Gender Marker measures how much a project invests in gender equality and women's empowerment. Select one for each output: GEN3 (Gender equality as a principle objective); GEN2 (Gender equality as a significant objective); GEN1 (Limited contribution to gender equality); GEN0

I. DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

Over the past three years, the Northwest Geopolitical zone of Nigeria has witnessed a rapid rise in the levels of violent conflict. A traditional farmer herder conflict has metamorphosed into a range of lethal cases of banditry, armed and organized crime with a negative knock-on effect on social and economic development in the region. The region features conflict patterns akin to the early stages of a protracted conflict, including those observed at the outset of the conflict in the Northeast zone of the country. A widespread and deep-rooted banditry phenomenon affects large parts of the population, with thousands of victims of violence every year, hundreds of thousands internally displaced persons, and considerable pressures on inter and intra-communal relations.

Rising insecurity has affected key social sectors – becoming increasingly intertwined with education as schools, teachers, and students have come under increasing attack. In 2021, 76% per cent of school attacks in Nigeria took place in the northwest; Kaduna state was the most frequently attacked (8/25), and Katsina (344 learners) followed by Zamfara states (327 learners) reported the highest number of abductees taken in a single abduction.[1] The unprecedented and growing attacks on schools in the NW Nigeria is reversing hard fought gains in access to, and retention of children in schools, in particular girls.

Without timely, collaborative, and decisive action, the region is likely to descend into widespread loss of governance control over large swaths of territory, a possible humanitarian crisis and a new foothold for regional violent extremist actors with grave implications to Nigeria's security.

CONFLICT TRENDS AND DYNAMICS

Since 2015, North West Nigeria has witnessed the transformation of long endemic cattle rustling and farmer-herder tensions into a range of much deadlier and more widespread conflicts, characterized by a rise in organized crime and an escalation of grievous attacks on local communities. While Zamfara state was the initial epicenter of the violence, the crisis has metastasized, and now directly affects adjacent communities in neighboring states (particularly Sokoto, Katsina, Kebbi, and Kaduna) where armed attacks and brazen mass kidnappings have gained an alarming frequency. This emerging dynamic points to the need for a **cross-state (regional) and cross-border approach** to tackling the insecurity and development challenges.

Although the conflict between the nomadic herders and farmer are ancient spanning decades, the two groups have a history of cooperation and understanding underpinned by the strength, effectiveness and credibility of community structures and authority – with pastoralists once known to adhere to integrated structures, norms and rules co-created as social contracts. Access to and use of land and natural resource management issues, compounded by climate change risks have further complicated this relationship and are key to understanding the changing dynamics of peace and stability in the North West. Rapid population growth has combined with an expanding desert, climate change, unchecked resource exploitation and 'land grabbing' has further increased competition for farm and grazing land and heightened tensions between farmers and herders. A relationship that existed - built on trust, mutual understanding, has been weakened rendering traditional dispute resolution processes and local peace building mechanisms less effective.

While the region has a long and proud history of Islamic and Arabic scholarship, it has struggled with formal education over the decades, which has contributed to a literacy rate of 29.7 per cent and the highest number of out-of-school children in the country³. Instead, a poorly funded '*almajiri system*' of full time migratory Quranic school remains incredibly popular despite producing millions of lowly skilled young adults with low economic and employment prospects; prospects compounded by poor and security governance issues.

Rising insecurity has further affected key social sectors – becoming increasingly intertwined with education as schools, teachers and students have come under increasing attack. In 2021, for example, 76% per cent of school attacks in Nigeria took place in the northwest; Kaduna state was the most frequently attacked (8/25), and Katsina (344 learners) followed by Zamfara states (327 learners) reported

³ Annual School Census – Ministry of Education, Nigeria (2019)

the highest number of abductees taken in a single abduction.[1]. As a precautionary measure, in the 2020/2021 academic year, over 11,000 schools were closed for four months significantly disrupting the education of 1.3 million children⁴. School dropout has also increased particularly among girls due to increased exposure to violence and the potential threat to violence. Lack of education and coupled with limited economic opportunity makes young people easy prey for bandit groups and impedes development in the region. Education is therefore seen as an utmost priority and schools could potentially be at the core of efforts to rebuild community cohesion and community led security. This key area of work will be further fleshed out by UNICEF in consultation with partners.

The conflict – and especially banditry phenomenon and instability in the Northwest is also rooted in socio-economic and political context that they occur. Bandit groups are materially motivated, and not ideologically driven – leading to an emerging “*banditry economic system*” that is locally embedded. This has had a dramatic impact on the lives and livelihoods of populations in the region. Over 12,000 people have lost their lives since 2016; livelihoods mostly agricultural activities have been significantly affected. In addition, the violence has led to the forcible displacement of over 1,000,000 people, who, in the absence of dedicated humanitarian support, have been forced to seek refuge with already burdened host communities who have continued to suffer mental health impacts by protracted conflict. The magnitude of the conflict impact has been compounded by the increased proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria and the Sahel region. A 2020 SBM Intelligence report estimates about 6,145,000 SALW in Nigeria's hands of civilian non-state actors calling for a holistic approach to supply and demand-side management.

The drivers of the conflict, and the reason why the conflict persists can be complex. Although the current situation has increasingly taken the form of conventional organized criminality, the ideological aspect that stands on foundations of feelings of long standing unfair treatment, long held grievances and perceived exclusion from modern day Nigeria exists; and serves as a driver of the crisis. Economic incentives in the form of ransom, and the economy around the liquidity that cash ransom brings ensures loyalty from communities, but a deeper look uncovers a shared solidarity from communities to non state actors in the underpinning grievances and perceived injustices of the Fulani population. These grievances were underlined in a recent interview with one of the most feared bandits, where several references to unaddressed grievances, unfair resolutions and high handedness from indigenous hausa vigilante groups were made.⁵ Therefore, drawing a line between bandits and communities is a difficult exercise, as bandits represent the manifestation of Fulani community grievances, creating an intertwining between the two. A conventional look at the issue will divide bandits and communities; while in reality a deeper look uncovers the idea that bandits are simply armed members of Fulani communities. These feelings of ethnic alienation, together with failed peace processes, with government accused of not fulfilling its promises converge to create an environment of mis trust and a lack of confidence on all sides of the conflict; making peace agreements, compacts and deals more difficult to negotiate. On the one side government-bandit agreements that have been broken due to a lack of synergy between Federal and State Governments have affected bandit and community confidence in government, while the development of protection practices by largely Hausa communities (such as banning Fulani from markets) perpetuates mis trust between Fulani and Hausa communities.

Unpacking the complex dynamics of conflicts in the NW cannot be complete without a review of the cross-border manifestations of instability. The North West of Nigeria shares a substantial border with Niger and Benin. The porosity of the border especially with Niger has contributed to the vulnerability of the region to the continuous flow of expectant herders, cross border recruits into criminal gangs and the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. While historically, different groups across the borders have coexisted side by side peacefully, with relationships consolidated by social activities, mutual economic independence and intermarriage, gradual degradation of grazing routes, and aggressive sub-group responses to disputes, poor governance have escalated tensions across the borders and a peculiar militarization of local dispute resolution channels transforming border areas into hubs of instability. These geographic and migratory peculiarities of the region make it pertinent that an engagement strategy is encompassing of the need for border governance as a security consolidation effort.

⁴ Ministry of Education Kaduna, Zamfara and Sokoto (June 2021). State Governor's close schools due to attacks

⁵ <https://dailytrust.com/how-i-joined-banditry-and-why-i-want-to-quit-bello-turji>

ONGOING RESPONSES AND GAPS

State and Federal governments have attempted several responses to the crisis ranging from political level mediation, to amnesties for perpetrators, kinetic action through military response to local community peace deals. Individual state government attempts at negotiating peace deals and amnesties in relation to bandits (incl. incarcerated bandits) failed, partly due to the interconnectivity of the banditry phenomenon across the states in the Northwest, as well as legitimacy questions of process. In some cases, the failure was lack of the systems, mechanisms and /or structures that could sustain engagement, translate the deals into peace processes and concrete activities and on a regular basis review the incentive structure based on changes in context. More recently, there have been Federal Government – Military led processes of building trust between the state and the non state armed groups by executing economic / infrastructure projects that brings largely Fulani communities closer to basic services and necessities. In return, pockets of bandits have agreed to a cease fire in parts of the region. There is therefore windows of opportunity to further under-study this model and explore entry points for systematic engagement and scale up especially in most affected areas.

Given the sheer spread of security challenges faced by Nigeria – and limited human and infrastructure capacity of the military, responses to the banditry challenges have been inadequate. The large remote and un-governed spaces are underserved with the available government security retreating further to urban areas.

The inability of government security forces (military, police, DSS) to provide sufficient community security and tackle banditry violence and prevent circle of violence and revenge attacks between herders and farmers remains a key challenge. While political-security cooperation works to some relative success at State level, there is limited evidence of the same at cross-state and cross-border levels respectively. Strengthening the capacities for coordination and cooperation as part of the border governance will be critical.

The insufficiency and ineffectiveness of federal, state, or local peace processes amidst intensified conflict has led to 'self-help-weaponization' of the region in the aim of filling the security void. Local conflict resolution mechanisms have broken down with the crisis leading to counter-mobilization among some affected communities, leading to increase in armed and supported local vigilante groups. Proliferation of vigilante groups (particularly the Yan Saki) while initially perceived as civilian guards eventually contributed to a deterioration in social cohesion and inter-communal relations. While the Sokoto government for example uses vigilante groups to fill gaps in government security provision, the Zamfara has opted to declare them illegal. Katsina State on the other hand has institutionalised vigilante groups under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders and the police. Much more broadly, the proliferation of these groups, including the emergence of informants has added an inter-communal and inter-ethnic coloration to the conflict.

While local mechanisms for dispute resolution have been weakened, an opportunity to further revitalize them building on existing systems as the social fabric in the region remains intact. Rising insecurity might have caused a social strain, but inter-communal relations still provide a foundation for communal stability. Traditional, religious institutions, kinship ties remain strong entry points for community cohesion, including through rebuilding local value systems for mutual accountability and trust. Linking such local systems to state level infrastructures for peace – with capacity to coordinate and support mediation, dialogue and reconciliation efforts is critical in sustaining peace processes. A mapping of existing structures at State, community and cross-border levels across the three states is proposed and will provide a baseline of systems through which the preventative actions will be steered.

II. PROPOSED PROJECT STRATEGY

From the above background, there is a dire urgent need to **preventing the Northwest from entering a possible downward spiral**. The armed banditry, organized crime and communal violence phenomena has put Northwest Nigeria on a downward trajectory with instability increasing and expanding. Although a final window of opportunity for reversing this trend exists, time is increasingly running out for preventing the emergence of a protracted conflict system bound to destabilize the region for the foreseeable future with even greater implications to Nigeria and the sub-region. The cost of inaction in terms of likely required future security, peace building humanitarian, stabilization and development assistance will be significant.

Such a preventative approach will need to be founded on key strategic directions:

- i. The need for **a cross-state and cross-border approach** to the banditry phenomenon due its regional interconnectedness, fluidity and mobility across borders.
- ii. Leverage the existing **level of political and security commitment by State and Federal Government to tackle banditry and offer corresponding mechanisms** to forge and nurture consensus for future preventive action engagements with political leadership at all levels
- iii. Deepen community-based conflict resolution mechanisms, structures and value systems for local peace building embedded within the existing **social fabric that remains intact as a foundation for preventive stabilisation efforts**
- iv. For community peace deals including mediation efforts to work, there is need to re-imagine and negotiate **new incentive structures built around local compacts that restore confidence between communities and their leaders on one hand, and non-state groups and government on the other. Through Local Peace Compacts**, opportunity costs for members of bandit groups will be modified in favour of disengagement through a combination of security pressure and viable exit options. This is particularly vital in light of the prevailing economic banditry system.
- v. **Education key to charting long-term pathway for development in the region:** Demographic pressure, gender challenges and receptiveness of youth to recruitment by bandit groups necessitate a strong focus on education and health with schools as a socio-cultural centre of rebuilding community cohesion.

Building on the above strategic thinking and informed by the complex dynamics in the region, a foundational phase is proposed to support government partners in translating their political-security commitment at national and state levels in effective action in priority areas through a new Preventative Action Programme across the states of Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina. Implementation will begin sequentially with Katsina state, Sokoto state (cross border) and Zamfara state – allowing the prevention programme to gain momentum through leveraging the well established infrastructures for peace in Katsina state. The overall intent is to leverage existing structures/commitment for a new mode of operations in priority locations, - by supporting governments in operationalising their political-security structures – help translate their commitment into effective action at the community level.

This programme co-designed with relevant (sub)-national government and community actors is built around the following interlinked approaches (with the fifth on social sector investments to be further fleshed out by UNICEF in consultation with key partners):

- 1) Supporting locally conceived political-security mechanisms and corresponding increased government security presence in strategic hotspot locations, including in Niger-Nigeria border regions (Jibia-Maradi in Katsina and Illela Birnin Konni in Sokoto)
- 2) Creating incentive structures for members of bandit groups and communities to engage in peace deals aimed at dissolving bandit groups and reintegrating former members,
- 3) Establish and or strengthen community peace building / conflict resolution mechanisms with a particular focus on enhancing local natural resource management in response to the evolving farmer-herder conflicts,
- 4) Strengthening state, cross-border peace and security coordination and economic revitalization efforts taking into account existing programmes on the Niger side, and
- 5) Position schools and strengthen education systems as peace building catalysts for community cohesion. This component will be further fleshed out in a complementary programme by UNICEF in consultation with development partners

The context related aspects that comprise complementing development activities aimed at creating the conditions for socio-economic revival of affected communities (incl. return of IDPs) in line with the security priorities will be further fleshed out on the envisaged road map for broader stakeholder engagement and support.

IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH

A four-pronged approach with complementary configurations of geography, actors and partnerships will be adopted in the implementation of this programme.

1. Regional Strategy (*cross-state*) approach – in a synergized manner that brings opportunities for different policy actors to interface with each other and advance a shared political commitment towards addressing the security challenge. A regional approach will ensure confidence building measures and peace and development compacts are synergized horizontally across states, and vertically, bringing in the Federal Government.
2. Localized response within each state – Aspects of the intervention will focus on localized and contextual peace responses unique to each individual state. This will include establishing and or strengthening local peace infrastructures and developing compacts on a state by state basis, with Katsina state being the first in the sequence due to the already developed mapping. Zamfara state would need a similar mapping process prior to full blown intervention..
3. Cross border response – The intervention acknowledges the cross-border dimension of the conflict and will have a dedicated cross border component that is implemented in synergy with the UNDP Niger team and corresponding existing programmes.
4. Political-security architecture with strong links with the federal government – to mobilise the much needed political backing and ensure effective security coordination. This would provide political cover from the federal level for the confidence-building measures and the compacts and for cross-border cooperation with Niger (output 1.2)

Theory of Change

This project is founded on a prevention agenda whose objective is to safeguard development gains in the North West States of Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina – and prevent the region from a downward spiral into a full-blown humanitarian crisis.

IF capacities for high level political and security leadership cooperation and unified leadership, mutual accountability and commitment to addressing the banditry violence in the North West are strengthened;

IF local level peacebuilding processes are sustained and structures for prevention strengthened

IF incentive structures for sustained engagement with bandits and communities to support local peace deals is developed; and

IF mechanisms for cross-border governance, economic revitalisation and security response are enhanced

IF confidence amongst conflict actors and the state is increased, and an enabling environment for disengagement is created

THEN local level peace processes will be sustainable, reducing the risk of continued violence and enabling socio-economic transformation in Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina States.

III. RESULTS AND PARTNERSHIPS

OUTPUT 1: Strengthened capacities at federal, state and cross-state levels for political accountability accountability and shared commitment on peace and security in Zamfara, Sokoto and Katsina States

The political governance and accountability structure to be established will leverage existing mechanisms and will foster partnership between security and civilian government actors (*within and across the three states as well as from the Federal level*), communities and international partners. This political enabling structure will have the mandate to mobilise political and social good-will at key levels, broker a shared political commitment and approach on the security challenges facing the region. The overall goal is to allow for a legitimate and frequent state led modality of bringing key stakeholders to the table to discuss, decide, resolve, and approve key determinations that relate to a State and cross-security response – while ensuring stronger linkages with the Federal government. At State level, these structures will also drive intra-state unity of action and synergy of the approach, building confidence across actors and processes, while facilitating negotiations that will lead to local compacts as a broader support package for affected communities. The structure will start with the frontline states of Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina, but with the ambition and potential to grow and cover all the seven states in the North West region. It is anticipated that these interlinked core political-security structures will serve as docking station for complementary programmes by both national and international partners and where feasible evolve into a steering mechanism for integrated efforts in the region.

Activity Results

- 1.1. Establish and or strengthen existing state and cross-state political, peace and security structures for confidence building and envisioning new modes of engagement around the security challenges in Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina States
- 1.2. Establish at Federal level an inclusive structure, guaranteed by the international community and the United Nations, that focuses on the incentive structure and alternatives for political engagement with members of bandit groups aimed at disengaging and reintegrating former members is developed and endorsed,
- 1.3. A road map and implementation framework that outlines new modes of cooperation between civilian and security actors across the three states is developed as basis for broader engagement in the North West, with the Federal Government and the international community
- 1.4. Dissemination of systematic trends, patterns, conflict and political economy analysis to inform early action, policy and decision making.

OUTPUT 2: Improved community capacities for conflict prevention, confidence and trust building in Zamfara, Katsina and Sokoto

For local peace deals to be sustained in the North West, there is need to re-think the incentive structures and approaches that underguard disengagement and reintegration efforts. This is because, the North West as outlined in the background is not only a complex security context, but demonstrates a delicate confluence of banditry and organised crime within the community's social fabric. In this regard, for any strategy seeking to address the security threats posed by banditry, will need to focus on the community as a whole system. In this regard, building confidence, restoring relationships of trust – between communities, non-state armed groups, government will be critical. For such efforts to happen and be sustained, neutral intermediaries (*rules, institutions, norms and values*) will need to be identified and supported, with the leadership of local authorities, traditional and religious leaders, and communities, to initiate these confidence building processes.

The political-security structures and processes supported under output 1 are to be utilised in building confidence between the various actors of the conflict. In particular, they will be employed to catalyze the effects of traditional peace building mechanisms and reintroduce these mechanisms as dependable and

fair tools of conflict resolution. Building trust will require the successful execution of **confidence building community support packages**, that are locally determined based on need and context, that are politically chaperoned by state/federal level actors, that rebuilds the social contract between communities and the state, and provides the platform for an offboarding vehicle for disengaging bandits. Once confidence has been strengthened, more comprehensive compacts can be established that outline agreements between the state and communities (*inclusive of bandits*). These local compacts will be carefully co-created / crafted and will differ from community to community based on emerging security dynamics and needs. The design stakeholders will be inclusive and representative of communities, and the compact will derive its legitimacy by being guaranteed by the state government in line with the federal guidelines. The compact will take the shape and form of a peace and development plan, that specifies development priorities within the community, and as such will go beyond the scope of what this programme is able to fulfil – providing an opportunity to bring in different development partners, UN agencies, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) with different mandates and diversified sources of funding.

Activity Results

- 2.1 Pilot confidence-building community support packages (*incl. empowerment, social, protection, mental measures*) laying the foundation for more comprehensive local compacts including victim support services and sustainable access to livelihoods.
- 2.2 Enhance capacities of local level peacebuilding mechanisms to manage peace and security challenges including resource-based conflicts
- 2.3 Leverage strengthened peace and security structures to broker, negotiate and pilot community peace and development compacts (support packages) as pathways for long term reconciliation and re-integration in selected affected LGAs
- 2.4 Civilian-security cooperation systems strengthened including community / neighbourhood watch, policing mechanisms and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

OUTPUT 3: Cross-border governance, peace and security cooperation, and economic revitalization services strengthened

The cross-border dynamics of insecurity due to the porous nature of the borders and unregulated mobility has put the core economic processes under severe strain. Security threats and limited mobility undermine economic processes, including, agriculture, regional trade, transhumance with implications to key economic hubs for example border markets. Market based associations and security coordination structures weakened. Through area-based approaches to programming linked to the community support packages, support will be provided along the Illela-Konni border area in Sokoto state and the Jibia-Maradi border in Katsina State, to catalyse the **revival of regional trade** strengthening previous cross-border security mechanisms (e.g., joint security meetings, joint border patrol operations) and support to rehabilitate border – markets, build capacity of associations and cross-border trade.

Activity Results

- 1.1 Joint cross-border security cooperation platforms including border patrol systems operationalized across the Illela-Konni and Jibia-maradi borders,
- 1.2 Rehabilitate existing physical market infrastructure; build capacity of economic associations and enhance mechanisms for resolving emerging natural resource or trade disputes across the border areas
- 1.3 Empower border communities through income generation activities targeting youth-and-women-led SMEs and MSMEs across border communities as part of confidence building measures

Resources Required to Achieve the Expected Results

A lean project management unit led by UNDP's Crisis Prevention and Recovery Advisor will be set up – leveraging existing capacities – complimented by outsourced individual contractors for targeted support. **Partnerships will be explored with Nigeria's Peace and Security ecosystem of civil society organisations, Faith Based Institutions, Security and Governance Institutions at Federal and State level to ensure effective implementation.** \$41,910,423 seed investment will be required to catalyse a strong prevention agenda in the three states to be scaled up moving forward. A robust and innovative resource mobilisation strategy including blended approaches will be developed and implemented to ensure the programme is sustainably resourced.

A multi-year work plan is provided in Section IV. The allocation of funding to the activities per year will be detailed in the Budget to be presented to the Steering Committee for approval before the start of each year.

Risks and Assumptions

A series of key assumptions informed the design of this project. This includes:

- **Banditry a Nigerian phenomenon:** The banditry phenomenon is mainly an internal Nigerian affair. It evolved from local natural resource conflicts and a tit for tat cycle of violence (primarily linked to competition for land and the lack of opportunities for youth) into a deeply entrenched organised crime problem. While Zamfara state is at the epicentre of the challenge, a cross-state approach to the banditry phenomenon is required due its regional interconnectedness and bandit mobility. Organisational links between bandit groups and terrorist outfits are (still) non-existent or weak. Opportunistic cooperation is likely to arise.
- **Preventing the Northwest from entering a downward spiral possible:** The banditry phenomenon has put Northwest Nigeria on a downward trajectory with instability increasing and expanding. Although a final window of opportunity for reversing this trend exists, time is running out for preventing the emergence of a protracted conflict system bound to destabilise the Northwest for the foreseeable future. The cost of inaction in terms of likely required future security, humanitarian, stabilisation and development assistance will be significant.
- **Adequate level of political commitment to tackling banditry to evolve:** Political acceptance that urgent action to tackle the banditry phenomenon is required is growing. Required political commitment and agreements for future preventive stabilisation engagements with political leadership at all levels are possible to forge.
- **Economic banditry system deeply rooted and linked to local economy:** Bandits institutionalised an illicit “economic banditry system” with increasing links to legal economic activities benefiting parts of local communities, thereby securing their (at minimum tacit) support.
- **Local social fabric remains intact and provides foundation for preventive stabilisation engagement:** Traditional community-based conflict resolution mechanisms, community structures and traditional value system are sufficiently intact to provide foundation for community peacebuilding/conflict resolution activities.
- **New incentive structures required for local peace deals and amnesties:** For local peacebuilding to work, the opportunity costs for members of bandit groups need to be modified in favour of disengagement through a combination of security pressure and viable exit options. This particularly applies to the prevailing economic banditry system.
- **Education key to charting long-term pathway for development:** Demographic pressure, gender challenges and receptiveness of youth to recruitment by bandit groups necessitate a strong focus on education and health with schools as a socio-cultural centre of communities.

With these assumptions, comes the major risks involved in undertaking this project revolves around two areas.

The first concerns political level commitment from a high level leadership at Federal and State level. The success of this project depends on the capacity to mobilise political good will at the top tier level – including strengthening security linkages at different levels. The lack of which could lead to fragmented implementation and limited impact. To mitigate against this risk, a specific output has been spelt out to support the establishment of high-level political and security cooperation and mutual-accountability platforms that will be enabled to mobilise the much needed political consensus around the project and ensure a whole-of-government and security-inter-agency cooperation in implementation.

Second is the commitment of partners to the process; i.e. their willingness and ability, particularly that of the state governments and local community groups, to be part of and fully participate in the peace building and development. This can be assured and mitigated by identifying and closely working with the most influential community leaders, elders, local authorities and representatives of faith-based organizations. It is also crucial that these state governments remain strategically and supportively engaged, to avoid disruptions to the smooth implementation of the programme.

Third, as the programme takes place in an area where conflict is active, regular and frequent, the safety of the implementation teams and community members is of concern because if not assured, it may jeopardize the implementation of the programme. These risks will be mitigated by drawing on

organizational experiences and expertise of working in hard to reach areas in the country and working closely with relevant agencies that support in matters of safety and security from within the UN system.

Another potential risk is that the initiative has a cross border dimension to it that synergizes activities across the border and across two separate countries. Although the local contexts for the implementation are similar – the separate countries' wider articulation of strategic priorities, expectations and perceptions can call into question the efficacy with which project synergy will be achieved.

These risks have been noted and mitigated through joint stakeholder consultation exercises between UNDP from both countries' and government counterparts. Due diligence in stakeholder analysis, gender considerations, and the provision of incentives will ensure ideal stakeholder representation during the planning processes that require representation. The implementers will work closely to ensure that safety and security protocols are adhered to. Sufficient logistic provisions will be made for staff, transportation, accommodation, venue etc. Due attention will also be given to staff involved in the programme as well as other stakeholders.

Partnerships and Stakeholder Engagement

Due to Nigeria's Federal structure, there is a complex nature to the stakeholders that will be involved directly and indirectly as partners and end-beneficiaries to ensure impactful project implementation.

At the Federal level, strategic political leadership within the presidency that oversees the implementation of the National Livestock Transformation Plan (NLTP) will play a central role. Military agencies through the Chief of Army Staff have become increasingly involved, with joint task forces established between the Air Force, Army with civil security authorities in the Nigerian Police Force, Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) and Civil Defence. The Office of National Security Advisor will also be engaged.

At the state level, political level leadership through the Executive Governors will be critical – in ensuring broader leadership and ownership of process – as well as co-support to project implementation. At micro-level, local government authority, traditional institutions, security advisers and local security departments will play a key role. From the government side, each of these will prove to be critical to the proposed work and will see regular and continuous engagement in all phases of the project.

Further at the local level, there are community groups, civil society, farmer associations such as All Farmers Association of Nigeria, with each state having a state chapter; the Herder association group, Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association Group has a similar structure.

At the cross-border level, partnerships will be strengthened with key border governance institutions including customs and immigration authorities, border patrol systems, local market authorities, economic associations and district authorities. Youth and women groups trading at the boarder areas will play a central role as partners and end beneficiaries as well.

Sister UN Agencies and Development partners will form a critical stakeholder as the goal is to position this project as a docking station where other development and socio-economic transformation projects / activities can be anchored leveraging the same governance architecture.

The initial activity during the inception phase of this project is to conduct a detailed stakeholders' analysis and consultative meetings to put into clear perspective what is the role of each stakeholder in the programme and how they will contribute to sustainability of peace in the region. Some of the baseline data will also be determined during the inception period.

South-South and Triangular Cooperation

The project will enhance the capacity of core political, peace and security institutions responding to complex conflict dynamics in the North West States of Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina. Co-learning and opportunities will also be explored with existing, ongoing and emerging complementary programmes in the region while also fostering synergies across the border especially with Niger Republic. Opportunities for cross-regional / country learning will be explored through UNDP Africa Borderlands Center that has built a portfolio of cross-border responses to conflict and instability. These exchanges will be through regional, sub-regional and inter-regional collective actions, including partnerships involving Governments, regional organizations, civil society, for mutual learning. Through triangular cooperation,

the project will benefit from the financial and technical support, experience and know-how of multilateral and developed-country partners.

Digital Solutions⁶

Digital tools and systems will be applied where appropriate in project implementation. For updating baselines, M&E and planned assessments, open source systems, technology tools will be used for accelerated data collection. ICT-based systems will also be employed in strengthening early warning systems for timely action.

Knowledge Management and Learning

Knowledge management and learning will form a key component of this project. This will be done through three main ways:

- a) Publishing communication materials related to project activities, outputs and project impact. Project activities will be documented in print, video, and other formats and widely disseminated. In this regard, the project will ensure suitable visibility of the project where possible and amplify the work being done by Government as part of the M&E and learning aspects;
- b) Second, a '*reflection practice series*' will be initiated where knowledge and learnings from implementing such complex projects across complex geographical zones will be documented as basis for multi-stakeholder learning through a technical level community of practice to be established.
- c) Lastly, period assessments including tracking conflict and stability trends, stakeholder analysis, capacity needs assessment will be documented and shared as knowledge products.

Sustainability and Scale Up

The issue of sustainability is enshrined in the principles that guide all interventions envisaged under this project. Aside from interventions to be implemented to build the capacity of national institutions, the project looks sustainable development solutions for a long term prevention agenda in the North West. With regard to sustainability and scaling up, the project plans to institute the following:

Foundations built on federal and sub-national local institutions: The design, testing and deployment of this project will leverage the institutional capacities of federal and sub-national institutions ranging from Security institutions, Government entities, Civil Society, Traditional Leaders and Local Authorities. This will not only enhance their capacities, but also promote local content and sustain buy-in in the long-term. Sustainability of this programme depends on the residual capacities that are domiciled within the local ecosystem.

Sustainability based on value-based outcomes and blended financing models: Ownership of the programme based on its value proposition will be the key pinnacle for sustainability. At societal level, as the programme improves capacities for prevention, opportunities for uptake including support will be further enhanced. The financing model is built around a strong cost-sharing model including with Government of Nigeria investment – both at Federal and State level – with local actors providing in-kind support to ensure effective implementation. Ownership of process, outcomes and results is a key component of sustainability.

Lastly, the high level political and security accountability and cooperation platform will be supported to provide a framework for other emerging, existing or ongoing programmes in the region. This project is actually developed as a docking station where other projects can be onboarded. There is therefore opportunities to scale this up beyond the three sample states of Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina.

⁶ Please see the [Guideline "Embedding Digital in Project Design"](#).

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES

- **Joint political leadership is a prerequisite for launching a preventive action programme:**
The formation of preventive action partnerships between:
 - o security and civilian government actors (within and cross the three states as well as the national level),
 - o communities and
 - o international partners
- **Human Rights Mainstreaming:** The project will mainstream human rights and have a human rights-based approach. This means ensuring the disadvantaged, hard to reach populations, have equal opportunities to participate.
- **Gender Mainstreaming:** As highlighted earlier in the document women and girls have been disproportionately impacted by conflict. The Project will ensure these inequalities are mitigated by ensuring strong gender-lens in implementation. Gender and inclusion strategy for the project will be developed. Victim support and recovery efforts will prioritise gendered dynamics of vulnerability.
- **Transparent mutual accountability structures at the outset:** Transparent mutual accountability structures are key in generating sufficient political commitment and leadership. They are an integral part of the anticipated preventive action partnerships and are established at the outset.
- **Alignment with political-security priorities:** The preventive action programme is integrated in the individual and cross-state government policy and planning processes (incl. project locations). Cooperation between civilian and security government actors is strengthened through alignment with government security priorities and planning.
- **Incentives structures in support of “peace deals”:** Capacities of security forces are strengthened so as to assist political actors in altering incentives structures for bandits to engage in disengagement and “*peace deal*” negotiations.
- **Community-peace building to heal inter-communal friction:** Communities are supported in fostering social cohesion through reconciliation and reintegration including traditional institutions and religious leaders. Vigilante groups are placed under the supervision of the traditional institutions and security agencies.
- **Reviving regional trade at border crossing:** Border areas are treated sui generis through an integrated border management approach reviving/rebuilding previous cross-border security mechanisms (e.g. joint security meetings, joint border patrol operations) and cross-border trade.
- **Focus operational coordination on local realities:** Once areas of operations have been identified by governments, coordination activities are conducted with actors having an operational presence in the area (rather than intended or alleged presence).
- **Strengthen international coherence:** An integrated preventive action appeal mechanism is created allowing for coordinated international action, communication and risk-sharing through joint governance structures and pooled funding.
- **Environment Considerations:** The Project is unlikely to have adverse impact on environment. The project will ensure that its activities proactively embed messages targeted at protection of environmental resources and in adherence to all relevant UNDP's commitment to climate change and environmental protection issues.

IV. PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Cost Efficiency and Effectiveness

Cost efficiency and effectiveness of this proposed project lies in the value for money (VfM) proposition defined by the intent to maximise the impact of the investment made to improve people's lives in the project states. The project adopts the 3-E framework (Please refer Figure below)⁷—economy, efficiency, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. In this regard, the project will undertake the following measures to maximize value for money:

- **Leveraging Partnerships and Comparative Capacities/Expertise:** The project will work with key strategic partners at national, sub-national and local levels. Partners consist of key Government Institutions, UN Agencies, I/NGOs/CSOs, faith institutions, think tanks. In effect, these project will leverage existing capacities within specific institutions that have a direct expertise, capacity and/or a leading stake in achieving one or more components of the project.
- **Using Competitive Procurement Processes:** The core governing principle of procurement in UNDP is to obtain the best value for money. In the procurement process, obtaining “best VfM” means selection of the offer, which presents the optimum combination of life-cycle costs and benefits, which meet the needs of beneficiaries.
- **Investing in Up-front Planning, Documentation and Evidence-Based Programming:** The project will invest in evidenced-based planning to allocate and target resources as strategically and efficiently as possible including identifying and addressing main drivers of costs.

Project Management

The Project will be implemented across the three States of Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina. In addition, an area-based cross-border response at Illela is envisaged. UNDP will implement the project in a Direct Implementation Modality (DIM). DIM is the modality whereby UNDP takes on full responsibility and accountability for the effective use of resources and the delivery of outputs, as set forth in the project document. UNDP will be responsible for the timely and effective implementation of respective programme activities, reporting and achievement of the programme deliverables as per the distribution of activities outlined in the budget and work plan.

A lean project management unit led UNDP's Crisis Prevention and Advisor (P5) will be set up comprised of both technical and operational support personnel. Three field Coordinators will be recruited to be based in Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina respectively. They will be supported in the field by a six (6) national UNVs – two in each of the States. A Conflict and Political Economy Specialist (NOC) will ensure project implementation and transformative investments are informed by regular trend analysis and conflict mapping. A Conflict Data Analyst and Early Warning Officer will support efforts towards enhancing mechanisms for early detection of conflict risks. An Area-based coordinator supported by a livelihoods specialist and civil-military analyst will support the implementation of cross-border activities. Technical assistance support costs have been integrated in the output areas. A Project Manager will be engaged ensure day to day administrative aspects of the project, while a project finance associate and project drivers will provide operational support. CO – M&E Analyst, Communications Unit, Finance, Procurement and IT will provide support to be charged through direct project costs (DPC). These have been spelt out as a standalone Output 4.

⁷. www.undp.org/content/dam/sudan/docs/.../Annex%209%20VfM%20Principles.docx

V. RESULTS FRAMEWORK⁸

Intended Outcome as stated in the UNSDCF/Country [or Regional] Programme Results and Resource Framework: UNSDPF OUTCOME: By 2027, people in Nigeria, especially the most vulnerable, benefit from peace and security, and protection from conflict, violence, and crime through strengthened capacity and infrastructures
Outcome indicators as stated in the Country Programme [or Regional] Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets: Indicator: Percentage of citizens that have confidence and satisfaction in good governance and public service delivery Baseline: 26% (2015), Target: 30%
Applicable Output(s) from the UNDP Strategic Plan: 3.2.1 National capacities strengthened for reintegration, reconciliation, peaceful management of conflict and prevention of violent extremism in response to national policies and priorities
Project title: North West Prevention Action Facility Atlas Project Number: To be Confirmed

⁸ UNDP publishes its project information (indicators, baselines, targets and results) to meet the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standards. Make sure that indicators are S.M.A.R.T. (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Time-bound), provide accurate baselines and targets underpinned by reliable evidence and data, and avoid acronyms so that external audience clearly understand the results of the project.

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES	BASELINE	TARGET			DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND RISKS
			YEAR	Year	Year	Year	
				1	2	3	
OUTPUT1 Strengthened capacities for cross-state political governance, mutual accountability and engagement on the Security situation in Zamfara, Sokoto and Katsina States	1.1 Number of political engagement and consensus building structure operationalised	Progress reports from the project, Board Meeting minutes	0	1	0	0	
	1.2 Strategic framework for Political and Security Leadership Cooperation on the North West	Strategic framework document, Project Reports	0	1	0	0	
	1.3 Framework for dialogue and engagement with conflict actors (incl. Bandit groups) to inform local peace deals	Progress Reports, Dialogue Framework	0	3	0	0	
	1.4 Number of systematic conflict trend analysis produced to inform policy and decision making	Conflict Trend Analysis Reports; Policy and Practice Papers Produced; Project progress reports	2	2	4	4	

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES	BASELINE	TARGET			DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND RISKS
			YEAR	Year	Year	Year	
				1	2	3	
OUTPUT 2 Improved capacities for community-based conflict transformation, peacebuilding in Zamfara, Katsina and Sokoto	2.1 Number of local level peacebuilding platforms addressing natural resource-based conflicts	Project progress reports, media reports, NGO reports	TBC	15	15	15	
	2.2 Number of State level systems working to manage the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons	State Government Reports, Project Reports	TBC	4 (One in each of the States incl. one at cross-border)	4 (One in each of the States incl. one at cross-border)	4 (One in each of the States incl. one at cross-border)	
	2.3 Number of local peace deals negotiated and sustained locally between communities and bandit groups	State Government Reports, Project Reports	TBC				
	2.4 Civilian – Military platforms contributing to peaceful co-existence within communities	State Government Reports, Project Reports	TBC	4 (One in each of the States incl. one at cross-border)	4 (One in each of the States incl. one at cross-border)	4 (One in each of the States incl. one at cross-border)	
	2.5 Number of Local compacts outlining peace, security and development packages for integrated response	State Government Reports, NGO partner reports, Project Reports	TBC	18 (six in each of the project states)	18 (six in each of the project states)	18 (six in each of the project states)	
	2.6 Number of communities receiving victim support packages	State Government Reports, NGO partner reports, Project Reports	TBC	18 (six in each of the project states)	18 (six in each of the project states)	18 (six in each of the project states)	

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES	BASELINE	TARGET			DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND RISKS
			YEAR	Year	Year	Year	
				1	2	3	
	including integrated MHPSS services in Project States (incl. communal livelihoods support)						
OUTPUT 3 Capacities for cross-border governance, peace and security cooperation, economic revitalization strengthened	3.1 Inter-agency cooperation platforms for coordinated and improved border governance and security operational in Illela	Agency Reports, Project Reports	TBC	1	1	1	
	3.2 Number of border governance and Security institutions providing improved services along the Illela – Konni border and Jibia-Maradi border areas of Nigeria and Niger Republic	Government Reports, Agency Reports, Citizen Perception Survey Reports, Project Reports	TBC	5	5	5	
	3.3 Existing infrastructure (incl. physical) for cross-border trade rehabilitated for economic empowerment	Government Reports, Agency Reports, Project Reports	TBC	3	3	3	

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES	BASELINE	TARGET			DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND RISKS
			YEAR	Year	Year	Year	
				1	2	3	
	3.4 Number of SMEs, and MSMEs whose commercial activities have been revitalised across the border area supported by the project	Beneficiary Reports, Project Reports	TBC	1,500	1,500	1,500	

VI. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Monitoring Plan

Monitoring Activity	Purpose	Frequency	Expected Action	Partners (if joint)	Cost (if any)
Track results progress	Progress data against the results indicators in the RRF will be collected and analysed to assess the progress of the project in achieving the agreed outputs.	Quarterly, or in the frequency required for each indicator.	Slower than expected progress will be addressed by project management.	Local authorities & MDAs	
Monitor and Manage Risk	Identify specific risks that may threaten achievement of intended results. Identify and monitor risk management actions using a risk log. This includes monitoring measures and plans that may have been required as per UNDP's Social and Environmental Standards. Audits will be conducted in accordance with UNDP's audit policy to manage financial risk.	Quarterly	Risks are identified by project management and actions are taken to manage risk. The risk log is actively maintained to keep track of identified risks and actions taken.	Local authorities & MDAs	
Learn	Knowledge, good practices and lessons will be captured regularly, as well as actively sourced from other projects and partners and integrated back into the project.	At least annually	Relevant lessons are captured by the project team and used to inform management decisions.	Local authorities & MDAs	
Annual Project Quality Assurance	The quality of the project will be assessed against UNDP's quality standards to identify project strengths and weaknesses and to inform management decision making to improve the project.	Annually	Areas of strength and weakness will be reviewed by project management and used to inform decisions to improve project performance.	Local authorities & MDAs	
Review and Make Course Corrections	Internal review of data and evidence from all monitoring actions to inform decision making.	At least annually	Performance data, risks, lessons and quality will be discussed by the project board and used to make course corrections.	Local authorities & MDAs	
Project Report	A progress report will be presented to the Project Board and key stakeholders, consisting of progress data showing the results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output level, the annual project quality rating summary, an updated risk log with mitigation measures, and any evaluation or review reports prepared over the period.	Annually, and at the end of the project (final report)		Local authorities & MDAs	
Project Review (Project Board)	The project's governance mechanism (i.e., project board) will hold regular project reviews to assess the performance of the project and review the Multi-Year Work Plan to ensure realistic budgeting over the life of the project. In the project's final year, the Project Board shall hold an end-of project review to capture lessons learned and discuss opportunities for scaling up and to socialize project results and lessons learned with relevant audiences.	Semi-Annual	Any quality concerns or slower than expected progress should be discussed by the project board and management actions agreed to address the issues identified.	Local authorities & MDAs	

Evaluation Plan⁹

Evaluation Title	Partners (if joint)	Related Strategic Plan Output	UNSDCF/CPD Outcome	Planned Completion Date	Key Evaluation Stakeholders	Cost and Source of Funding
Final Evaluation	N/A	3.2.1	UNSDPF Outcome 1	N/A	UNDP	

⁹ Optional, if needed

VII. MULTI-YEAR WORK PLAN ¹⁰¹¹

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	PLANNED BUDGET BY YEAR			RESPON SIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Y1	Y2	Y3		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
Output 1: Strengthened capacities for cross-state political governance, mutual accountability and engagement on the Security situation in Zamfara, Sokoto and Katsina States <i>Gender marker: 2</i>	1.1 Support the establishment of a high level political engagement and consensus building structure on the evolving Security Situation in the North West	100,000	100,000	100,000	UNDP			300,000
	1.2 Support the development of a strategic framework to guide political and security engagement and cooperation on the North West	100,000	100,000	100,000	UNDP			300,000
	1.3 Support the development of a dialogue and negotiation strategy for engaging parties to the North West Conflict (incl. Bandits) to inform local peace deals	100,000	100,000	100,000	UNDP			300,000
	1.4 Support the production of systematic conflict trend and dynamics analysis to inform policy and decision making	200,000	200,000	200,000	UNDP		Technical Support	600,000

¹⁰ Cost definitions and classifications for programme and development effectiveness costs to be charged to the project are defined in the Executive Board decision DP/2010/32

¹¹ Changes to a project budget affecting the scope (outputs), completion date, or total estimated project costs require a formal budget revision that must be signed by the project board. In other cases, the UNDP programme manager alone may sign the revision provided the other signatories have no objection. This procedure may be applied for example when the purpose of the revision is only to re-phase activities among years.

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	PLANNED BUDGET BY YEAR			RESPON SIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Y1	Y2	Y3		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
	1.5 Deploy technical and policy advisory services of a Senior Advisor on Crisis Prevention and Recovery Advisor and Conflict and Political Economy Specialist to support implementation of this output area	400,000	400,000	400,000			Technical assistance and policy advisory	1,200,000
	MONITORING	10,000	10,000	10,000				30,000
	Sub-Total for Output 1							2,730,000
Output 2: Improved capacities for community-based conflict transformation, peacebuilding in Zamfara, Katsina and Sokoto <i>Gender marker: 2</i>	2.1 Support local level peacebuilding platforms addressing natural resource-based conflicts	500,000	500,000	500,000				1,500,000
	2.2 Support the establishment or strengthening of State level systems working to manage the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons	200,000	200,000	200,000				600,000
	2.3 Support efforts towards the negotiation of local peace deals in communities affected by banditry	500,000	500,000	500,000				1,500,000
	2.4 Support civilian – military platforms contributing to peaceful co-existence within communities	200,000	200,000	200,000				600,000

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	PLANNED BUDGET BY YEAR			RESPON SIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Y1	Y2	Y3		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
	2.5 Number of communities receiving integrated social rehabilitation services in Project States (incl. MHPSS, Trauma Healing and communal livelihoods support)	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000				9,000,000
	2.6 Deploy the services of 3 Field Peacebuilding Coordinators, 6 Project Officers, 3 Data Analytics and 3 Conflict Early Warning Specialists to support the implementation of activities under this output area	500,000	500,000	500,000				1,500,000
	MONITORING	20,000	20,000	20,000				60,000
	Sub-Total for Output 2							14,760,000
Output 3: Capacities for cross-border governance, peace and security cooperation, economic revitalization strengthened <i>Gender marker:2</i>	3.1 Provide support towards strengthened inter-agency cooperation between key security and border governance institutions in Illela border area	200,000	200,000	200,000				600,000
	3.2 Rehabilitate and build capacity of Security institutions for improved public service delivery along the Illela – Konni border areas of Nigeria and Niger Republic	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000				4,500,000

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	PLANNED BUDGET BY YEAR			RESPON SIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Y1	Y2	Y3		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
	3.3 Rehabilitate and build the capacity of cross-border trade systems, structures and platforms for economic empowerment	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000				3,000,000
	3.4 Provide support to 4,500 youth and female headed SMEs, and MSMEs for revitalised cross-border trade	2,000,000	3,000,000	4,500,000				9,500,000
	3.5 Deploy the services of an Area-Based Coordinator, Livelihoods Specialist, Civil-Military Analyst to support the implementation of activities under this output	400,000	400,000	400,000				1,600,000
	MONITORING	30,000	30,000	30,000				90,000
	Sub-Total for Output 3							19,290,000
Output 4: Strengthened capacities for Project Evaluation, Administration, Audits, Communication and Outreach	Mid & End of Project Evaluation	N/A	50,000	50,000				100,000
	Project Associate	30,000	30,000	30,000				90,000
	Project Drivers	20,000	20,000	20,000				60,000
	Project Procurement Associate	30,000	30,000	30,000				90,000
	Audit and Capacity Assessments		100,000	100,000				200,000
	Project Communication Officer	30,000	30,000	30,000				90,000
	Sub-Total for Output 4							630,000
Direct Project Costing (4.03%) of total programmable Budget	Cover Project Assurance, M&E, Finance and Procurement Costs							1,507,623

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	PLANNED BUDGET BY YEAR			RESPON SIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Y1	Y2	Y3		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
General Management Support 8% (of Programmable Budget)		997,600	997,600	997,600	UNDP		Project quality assurance	2,992,800
GRAND TOTAL								41,910,423

VIII. GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

The project will be executed using the Direct Implementation (DIM) modality. The UNDP will be accountable for the planning, implementation, and oversight, as well as financial management and reporting. Responsible parties will be engaged to take the lead in implementing designated specific activities, overseen by UNDP.


The **Project Board** is composed of the following three roles: The **Senior Executive** includes: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning, Senior Government representative from the Presidency, Leadership from the Security Agencies including the Office of the National Security Adviser, UNDP, and the State Governments of Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina. **Senior beneficiaries** the three state governments; and **Senior Suppliers** include Germany, and other potential supporting partners including the EU, Norway.

The **Project Assurance** team provides quality assurance and M&E services to the project. The project will leverage expertise from the UNDP's PMSU play Assurance Role to support the Project Board and UNDP Programme Management by carrying out objective and independent project oversight, and monitoring function.

The **Policy and Technical Support team** comprised of the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Advisor, Conflict and Political Economy Specialist, Field Coordinators, Early Warning Specialist and Data Analysts will ensure strategic policy and technical input for effective implementation of the project. The Crisis Prevention and Recovery Advisor will provide advisory support to programme implementation and ensure integration of best practices, facilitate knowledge exchange and learning across various pillars of the project. The Advisor will also manage and supervise the Project Management Unit. The project will also tap into technical support from UNDP's Advisor on Rule of Law, Human Rights and Access to Justice.

Project Manager will be responsible for the day to day running of the project as well as project results. The Project Manager will provide secretariat support to the Project Board including the preparation of financial performance and development results as indicated in the Result and Resources Framework (RRF).

Project support team includes staff who provides subject matter support Procurement, HR, finance, administration, logistic and travel, and transport services.



IX. LEGAL CONTEXT

*[NOTE: Please choose **one** of the following options, as applicable. Delete all other options from the document]*

Option a. Where the country has signed the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA)

This project document shall be the instrument referred to as such in Article 1 of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement between the Government of (country) and UNDP, signed on (date). All references in the SBAA to “Executing Agency” shall be deemed to refer to “Implementing Partner.”

This project will be implemented by [name of entity] (“Implementing Partner”) in accordance with its financial regulations, rules, practices and procedures only to the extent that they do not contravene the principles of the Financial Regulations and Rules of UNDP. Where the financial governance of an Implementing Partner does not provide the required guidance to ensure best value for money, fairness, integrity, transparency, and effective international competition, the financial governance of UNDP shall apply.

This project will be implemented by [name of entity] (“Implementing Partner”) in accordance with its financial regulations, rules, practices and procedures only to the extent that they do not contravene the principles of the Financial Regulations and Rules of UNDP. Where the financial governance of an Implementing Partner does not provide the required guidance to ensure best value for money, fairness, integrity, transparency, and effective international competition, the financial governance of UNDP shall apply.

X. RISK MANAGEMENT

Option b. UNDP (DIM)

1. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will comply with the policies, procedures and practices of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS.)
2. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the [project funds]¹² [UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document]¹³ are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism, that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the United Nations Security Council Consolidated Sanctions List, and that no UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document are used for money laundering activities. The United Nations Security Council Consolidated Sanctions List can be accessed via <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/un-sc-consolidated-list>. This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.
3. Social and environmental sustainability will be enhanced through application of the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards (<http://www.undp.org/ses>) and related Accountability Mechanism (<http://www.undp.org/secu-srm>).
4. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will: (a) conduct project and programme-related activities in a manner consistent with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards, (b) implement any management or mitigation plan prepared for the project or programme to comply with such standards, and (c) engage in a constructive and timely manner to address any concerns and complaints raised through the Accountability Mechanism. UNDP will seek to ensure that communities and other project stakeholders are informed of and have access to the Accountability Mechanism.
5. In the implementation of the activities under this Project Document, UNDP as the Implementing Partner will handle any sexual exploitation and abuse (“SEA”) and sexual harassment (“SH”) allegations in accordance with its regulations, rules, policies and procedures.
6. All signatories to the Project Document shall cooperate in good faith with any exercise to evaluate any programme or project-related commitments or compliance with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards. This includes providing access to project sites, relevant personnel, information, and documentation.

¹² To be used where UNDP is the Implementing Partner

¹³ To be used where the UN, a UN fund/programme or a specialized agency is the Implementing Partner

7. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will ensure that the following obligations are binding on each responsible party, subcontractor, and sub-recipient:
- a. Consistent with the Article III of the SBAA *[or the Supplemental Provisions to the Project Document]*, the responsibility for the safety and security of each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient and its personnel and property, and of UNDP's property in such responsible party's, subcontractor's and sub-recipient's custody, rests with such responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient. To this end, each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient shall:
 - i. put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the security situation in the country where the project is being carried;
 - ii. assume all risks and liabilities related to such responsible party's, subcontractor's and sub-recipient's security, and the full implementation of the security plan.
 - b. UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place, and to suggest modifications to the plan when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall be deemed a breach of the responsible party's, subcontractor's and sub-recipient's obligations under this Project Document.
 - c. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient (each a "sub-party" and together "sub-parties") acknowledges and agrees that UNDP will not tolerate sexual harassment and sexual exploitation and abuse of anyone by the sub-parties, and other entities involved in Project implementation, either as contractors or subcontractors and their personnel, and any individuals performing services for them under the Project Document.
 - (a) In the implementation of the activities under this Project Document, each sub-party shall comply with the standards of conduct set forth in the Secretary General's Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13 of 9 October 2003, concerning "Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse" ("SEA").
 - (b) Moreover, and without limitation to the application of other regulations, rules, policies and procedures bearing upon the performance of the activities under this Project Document, in the implementation of activities, each sub-party, shall not engage in any form of sexual harassment ("SH"). SH is defined as any unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that might reasonably be expected or be perceived to cause offense or humiliation, when such conduct interferes with work, is made a condition of employment or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. SH may occur in the workplace or in connection with work. While typically involving a pattern of conduct, SH may take the form of a single incident. In assessing the reasonableness of expectations or perceptions, the perspective of the person who is the target of the conduct shall be considered.
 - d. In the performance of the activities under this Project Document, each sub-party shall (with respect to its own activities), and shall require from its sub-parties (with respect to their activities) that they, have minimum standards and procedures in place, or a plan to develop and/or improve such standards and procedures in order to be able to take effective preventive and investigative action. These should include: policies on sexual harassment and sexual exploitation and abuse; policies on whistleblowing/protection against retaliation; and complaints, disciplinary and investigative mechanisms. In line with this, sub-parties will and will require that their respective sub-parties will take all appropriate measures to:
 - (i) Prevent its employees, agents or any other persons engaged to perform any services under this Project Document, from engaging in SH or SEA;
 - (ii) Offer employees and associated personnel training on prevention and response to SH and SEA, where sub-parties have not put in place its own training regarding the prevention of SH and SEA, sub-parties may use the training material available at UNDP;
 - (iii) Report and monitor allegations of SH and SEA of which any of the sub-parties have been informed or have otherwise become aware, and status thereof;
 - (iv) Refer victims/survivors of SH and SEA to safe and confidential victim assistance; and
 - (v) Promptly and confidentially record and investigate any allegations credible enough to warrant an investigation of SH or SEA. Each sub-party shall advise UNDP of any such allegations received and investigations being conducted by itself or any of its sub-parties with respect to their activities under the Project Document, and shall keep UNDP informed during the investigation by it or any of such sub-parties, to the extent that such notification (i) does not jeopardize the conduct of the investigation, including but not limited to the safety or security of persons, and/or (ii) is not in contravention of any laws applicable to it. Following the investigation, the relevant sub-party shall advise UNDP of any actions taken by it or any of the other entities further to the investigation.
 - e. Each sub-party shall establish that it has complied with the foregoing, to the satisfaction of UNDP, when requested by UNDP or any party acting on its behalf to provide such confirmation. Failure

of the relevant sub-party to comply of the foregoing, as determined by UNDP, shall be considered grounds for suspension or termination of the Project.

- f. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will ensure that any project activities undertaken by them will be implemented in a manner consistent with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards and shall ensure that any incidents or issues of non-compliance shall be reported to UNDP in accordance with UNDP Social and Environmental Standards.
- g. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will take appropriate steps to prevent misuse of funds, fraud, corruption or other financial irregularities, by its officials, consultants, subcontractors and sub-recipients in implementing the project or programme or using the UNDP funds. It will ensure that its financial management, anti-corruption, anti-fraud and anti money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism policies are in place and enforced for all funding received from or through UNDP.
- h. The requirements of the following documents, then in force at the time of signature of the Project Document, apply to each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient: (a) UNDP Policy on Fraud and other Corrupt Practices (b) UNDP Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Policy; and (c) UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations Investigation Guidelines. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient agrees to the requirements of the above documents, which are an integral part of this Project Document and are available online at www.undp.org.
- i. In the event that an investigation is required, UNDP will conduct investigations relating to any aspect of UNDP programmes and projects. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will provide its full cooperation, including making available personnel, relevant documentation, and granting access to its (and its consultants', subcontractors' and sub-recipients') premises, for such purposes at reasonable times and on reasonable conditions as may be required for the purpose of an investigation. Should there be a limitation in meeting this obligation, UNDP shall consult with it to find a solution.
- j. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will promptly inform UNDP as the Implementing Partner in case of any incidence of inappropriate use of funds, or credible allegation of fraud, corruption other financial irregularities with due confidentiality.
Where it becomes aware that a UNDP project or activity, in whole or in part, is the focus of investigation for alleged fraud/corruption, each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will inform the UNDP Resident Representative/Head of Office, who will promptly inform UNDP's Office of Audit and Investigations (OAI). It will provide regular updates to the head of UNDP in the country and OAI of the status of, and actions relating to, such investigation.
- k. *Choose one of the three following options:*
Option 1: UNDP will be entitled to a refund from the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient of any funds provided that have been used inappropriately, including through fraud corruption, other financial irregularities or otherwise paid other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Project Document. Such amount may be deducted by UNDP from any payment due to the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient under this or any other agreement. Recovery of such amount by UNDP shall not diminish or curtail any responsible party's, subcontractor's or sub-recipient's obligations under this Project Document.
Option 2: Each responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient agrees that, where applicable, donors to UNDP (including the Government) whose funding is the source, in whole or in part, of the funds for the activities which are the subject of the Project Document, may seek recourse to such responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient for the recovery of any funds determined by UNDP to have been used inappropriately, including through fraud corruption or other financial irregularities or otherwise paid other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Project Document.
Option 3: UNDP will be entitled to a refund from the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient of any funds provided that have been used inappropriately, including through fraud corruption or other financial irregularities, or otherwise paid other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Project Document. Such amount may be deducted by UNDP from any payment due to the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient under this or any other agreement.
Where such funds have not been refunded to UNDP, the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient agrees that donors to UNDP (including the Government) whose funding is the source, in whole or in part, of the funds for the activities under this Project Document, may seek recourse to such responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient for the recovery of any funds determined by UNDP to have been used inappropriately, including through fraud, corruption or other financial irregularities, or otherwise paid other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Project Document.

Note: The term “Project Document” as used in this clause shall be deemed to include any relevant subsidiary agreement further to the Project Document, including those with responsible parties, subcontractors and sub-recipients.

- l. Each contract issued by the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient in connection with this Project Document shall include a provision representing that no fees, gratuities, rebates, gifts, commissions or other payments, other than those shown in the proposal, have been given, received, or promised in connection with the selection process or in contract execution, and that the recipient of funds from it shall cooperate with any and all investigations and post-payment audits.
- m. Should UNDP refer to the relevant national authorities for appropriate legal action any alleged wrongdoing relating to the project or programme, the Government will ensure that the relevant national authorities shall actively investigate the same and take appropriate legal action against all individuals found to have participated in the wrongdoing, recover and return any recovered funds to UNDP.
- n. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient shall ensure that all of its obligations set forth under this section entitled “Risk Management” are passed on to its subcontractors and sub-recipients and that all the clauses under this section entitled “Risk Management Standard Clauses” are adequately reflected, *mutatis mutandis*, in all its sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into further to this Project Document.

Special Clauses. In case of government cost-sharing through the project, the following clauses should be included:

- 1. The schedule of payments and UNDP bank account details.
 - 2. The value of the payment, if made in a currency other than United States dollars, shall be determined by applying the United Nations operational rate of exchange in effect on the date of payment. Should there be a change in the United Nations operational rate of exchange prior to the full utilization by the UNDP of the payment, the value of the balance of funds still held at that time will be adjusted accordingly. If, in such a case, a loss in the value of the balance of funds is recorded, UNDP shall inform the Government with a view to determining whether any further financing could be provided by the Government. Should such further financing not be available, the assistance to be provided to the project may be reduced, suspended or terminated by UNDP.
 - 3. The above schedule of payments takes into account the requirement that the payments shall be made in advance of the implementation of planned activities. It may be amended to be consistent with the progress of project delivery.
 - 4. UNDP shall receive and administer the payment in accordance with the regulations, rules and directives of UNDP.
 - 5. All financial accounts and statements shall be expressed in United States dollars.
 - 6. If unforeseen increases in expenditures or commitments are expected or realized (whether owing to inflationary factors, fluctuation in exchange rates or unforeseen contingencies), UNDP shall submit to the government on a timely basis a supplementary estimate showing the further financing that will be necessary. The Government shall use its best endeavours to obtain the additional funds required.
 - 7. If the payments referred above are not received in accordance with the payment schedule, or if the additional financing required in accordance with paragraph 6 above is not forthcoming from the Government or other sources, the assistance to be provided to the project under this Agreement may be reduced, suspended or terminated by UNDP.
 - 8. Any interest income attributable to the contribution shall be credited to UNDP Account and shall be utilized in accordance with established UNDP procedures.
- In accordance with the decisions and directives of UNDP's Executive Board:
- The contribution shall be charged:
- (a) [8%] cost recovery for the provision of general management support (GMS) by UNDP headquarters and country offices
 - (b) Direct cost for implementation support services (ISS) provided by UNDP and/or an executing entity/implementing partner.
- 9. Ownership of equipment, supplies and other properties financed from the contribution shall vest in UNDP. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by UNDP shall be determined in accordance with the relevant policies and procedures of UNDP.
 - 10. The contribution shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures provided for in the financial regulations, rules and directives of UNDP.”

XI. ANNEXES

1. **Project Quality Assurance Report**
2. **Social and Environmental Screening Template** [\[English\]](#) [\[French\]](#) [\[Spanish\]](#), including additional Social and Environmental Assessments or Management Plans as relevant. *(NOTE: The SES Screening is not required for projects in which UNDP is Administrative Agent only and/or projects comprised solely of reports, coordination of events, trainings, workshops, meetings, conferences, preparation of communication materials, strengthening capacities of partners to participate in international negotiations and conferences, partnership coordination and management of networks, or global/regional projects with no country level activities).*
3. **Risk Analysis.** Use the standard [Risk Register template](#). Please refer to the [Deliverable Description of the Risk Register](#) for instructions
4. **Capacity Assessment:** Results of capacity assessments of Implementing Partner (including Partner Capacity Assessment Tool (PCAT) and HACT Micro Assessment)
5. **Project Board Terms of Reference and TORs of key management positions.** The standard Project Board TOR can be found [here](#).
6. **On-Granting Provisions Applicable to the Implementing Partner**¹⁴. On-granting clauses for non-UNDP Implementing Partners can be found [he re](#).

¹⁴ Applicable for non-UNDP Implementing Partner as Grant Making Institution facilitating on-granting.